

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910-1911. London: Williams & Norgate, 1911.

THE volume of *Proceedings* under review contains some interesting and important papers. Psychology enjoys the greatest favour of any one subject, but logic and theory of knowledge are well represented, and there is one contribution on Ethics by Miss Oakeley.

The first paper, by Prof. Alexander, is on 'Self as Subject and as Person'. It abounds in startling and heretical views. The writer distinguishes two meanings of Self: (i.) Subject who thinks, wills, etc., and (ii.) The body. The Person is a combination of (i.) and (ii.). The object of the paper is to show that (i.) never is a presentation, that (ii.) always is; whilst (iii.) partly is and partly is not. Under the title of 'body' Prof. Alexander includes all in which we are interested. But, later on, he remarks that consciousness and the body are localised in much the same place, so that here he cannot be using 'body' to include e.g. Psychology as he does at the beginning of his paper.

The Subject is consciousness as an element in all experiences. In cognitive consciousness the object is never mental; it is the other element alongside of the conscious act. To be conscious of an object just means that that object evokes the act of consciousness. I do not see that this follows. I agree that you can and must separate the object of perception from the element of consciousness and that the object is so far non-mental that its qualities are physical like size and shape. But this does not involve either (a) that it may not depend for its existence on its relation to consciousness; nor (b) does it seem obvious that because the mind must be influenced by something in order to perceive X it is X that must influence it.

The Subject then 'consists of certain conscious acts'. We are further told that it is a thing, that it is 'enjoyed or suffered but not contemplated'. It is extended and acts of consciousness have direction; and, finally, consciousness is a property of certain kinds of neural activity. Assuming that the subject is a set of related mental events and that a thing is also a related complex of states we may agree that such a subject as Prof. Alexander suggests may be a thing. But it is rather an unusual kind of thing if the events that constitute it are themselves qualities of something else (viz. neural activities) as the writer asserts. With regard to the extension of consciousness and the direction of conscious acts the argument is that we are vaguely aware of extensity and direction from immediate experience and that psychological investigations enable us to localise accurately by reference to the brain and nerves. I do not possess the alleged introspective evidence, nor do I see what ground there would be for identifying vaguely felt directions of conscious acts (if such there be) with directions in the brain which are afterwards found to be connected with them.

But the most important question is about self-consciousness. The Subject, Prof. Alexander says, cannot be an object of contemplation. Two reasons are offered. (a) If so it would be a sensible thing, and it is not; and (b) It would imply that my mind can act on itself. No weight can be laid on (b) if we do not admit Prof. Alexander's contention that my knowledge of X must always be evoked by X itself. With regard to (a) I do not see that the author has proved it. The fact that the objects of some direct awareness are not mental but physical is no reason why the objects of all direct awareness should be physical. It seems to me quite clear that we can and do make our mental acts objects of direct awareness, whatever may be the case with the self as a whole.

We are told that the act of experiencing 'is experienced though not in the same way as the object that it is directed upon. It is itself experiencing and is experienced only as we strike a stroke as opposed to striking a ball.' But to strike a stroke means no more than to strike, whilst to experience an experiencing means more than merely to experience unless the whole question is begged.

The view that we cannot contemplate as objects the states of our self compels Prof. Alexander to give a special account of the memory of such states which amounts practically to the renewal of states like those that have gone by.

The next paper is by Prof. Bosanquet who criticises a remark of Bergson's that the function of the intellect is to link like to like. It is argued that this is not a tenable account of inductive processes, but that the ordinary logical account of induction as a process of elimination tacitly assumes it to be true. The writer has no difficulty in showing the barrenness of the principle 'Same Cause when repeated gives same Effect,' and thus he leads up to his doctrine of the concrete universal. What his own suggestion appears to amount to is 'Something more or less like the old antecedent will probably be followed by something more or less like the old consequent,' together with the view that the general procedure of science is an attempt to see just how much identity and of what kind is needed in transferring laws from the known to the as yet untested. If this be the argument we may agree that it cannot be treated formally with the precision of which eliminative methods allow.

Dr. Schiller's Essay on 'Error' contains some excellent criticisms on the theory of truth of which Mr. Joachim's Essay is typical; though I cannot understand why Dr. Schiller should invariably assume that all non-Fragmatists must hold Mr. Joachim's theory of truth. Dr. Schiller's treatment of Error seems to suffer from a confusion between error and the recognition of error. We are told that: 'For a mind which errs whatever is affirmed seems true and error does not exist. Thus error comes into being only by being found out.' Surely the right statement would be that it only comes into *knowledge* by being found out. Otherwise what is the force of 'seems' in the first sentence quoted? Again the fact that we are 'not entitled to call any opinion erroneous until we have seen our way to a better' does not tell us anything about error but only about the conditions under which error can be recognised. So that I do not agree that 'the existence of error necessarily implies a second assertion'.

I agree with Dr. Schiller that for a theory of truth like Mr. Joachim's either all is true or all error, but I cannot see why the Formal Logician is also incapable of detecting error. He cannot detect all errors; but surely he can detect formal fallacies.

Error is finally defined as 'what thwarts a human purpose in cognitive activity'. If the latter phrase means 'what thwarts a human purpose to get at the truth' it will hardly be denied that this is a mark of error,

though, since it is also a mark of headache and many other things, this is hardly a correct definition.

Finally it seems to me that the old criticism is valid that, when you take fulfilment or frustration of a purpose as a criterion of truth the question of whether the purpose is really fulfilled or frustrated has to be true in some sense independent of any reference to purpose.

Intellectualists will be grieved to learn from the conclusion of the paper that to their other disabilities has now been added the fact that they have no right to be able to see a joke.

Mr. Carr's article on Parallelism accepts Bergson's argument that that doctrine is incompatible with either idealism or realism. Neither side of the argument appears to me to be necessarily true. Parallelism could be stated in terms of any idealism that is not purely subjective. And the alleged incompatibility with realism might be answered as follows: If the result of X acting on my body is a physiological process which is itself a complete cause of my perception of X then (a) it is gratuitous to suppose that exactly the same process could be set up if X did not exist, and (b) supposing that this were possible and that parallelism is true we should merely get on the mental side the mental reaction appropriate to the perception of X if it were there to be perceived, but it would lack an object in this case. The difficulties of parallelism lead Mr. Carr to desert natural science for a Bergsonian view of the nature of reality.

The positive part of Miss Jones's paper on 'A New Law of Thought' is an attempt to show that all affirmative propositions primarily assert identity of denotation with diversity of connotation. By connotation she means what Dr. Keynes calls 'subjective intension,' since for her even proper names have connotation in use. This analysis Miss Jones holds to be prior to any other analysis of propositions. She then attempts to show that the usual immediate inferences follow. To do this she has to combine her law with the quantification of the predicate; for, on her view, S is P always gives P is S; so that she must reduce all conversion to simple conversion. The phrase 'identity of denotation' must be taken to mean that some part and it may be all of the denotation of one term is identical with some part and it may be all of that of the other.

The latter part of the paper consists of replies to objections to this theory brought by Mr. Russell. These take us to Mr. Russell's paper on 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and by Description'. Here Mr. Russell asks: 'What do we know when we know propositions about "the so and so" without knowing directly the object denoted by this descriptive phrase?' We have direct acquaintance with sense-data, with certain universals, and probably with ourselves; but our knowledge of the external world and of other persons is of the descriptive kind. To be assured of the truth of any proposition about 'the so and so' we must have direct acquaintance with some particular or particulars. When we make an assertion about 'the so and so' what we should like would be to have direct acquaintance with the object described by the phrase, but this is in general impossible, and what we get is a description of the proposition that we should like to affirm. Even when we use proper names as subjects they are really descriptive phrases.

Mr. Russell then asserts that every proposition that we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. This must be understood in connexion with his theory of judgment. Judgment for him is a complex united by a many-term relation, and the argument is that all the terms in any judgment must be objects of acquaintance to the mind which is also a term in the judgment. It follows

that in a proposition that contains the phrase 'the so and so' the real judgment does not contain the term thus described. It is in the attempt to reinforce this theory from the logical side that Mr. Russell and Miss Jones come to blows. There are various answers and arguments, but, as touching the present question, the essential point seems to be that Mr. Russell holds that on Miss Jones's theory the object denoted by a descriptive phrase must be a constituent of the judgment. This does not seem to me to be necessary. On Miss Jones's view: Scott is the Author of *Waverley* means that the object denoted by 'Scott' (whatever that may be) is identical with the object denoted by the phrase 'The Author of *Waverley*'. I fail to see that this involves direct acquaintance with the object called 'Scott'; hence so far Mr. Russell's and Miss Jones's theories seem compatible.

Mr. Russell has however two independent arguments: (i.) Some descriptive phrases like 'the round square' have no denotation, and (ii.) An alleged vicious infinite regress. I do not think that Miss Jones extricates herself from the first difficulty. But has the phrase 'round square' any subjective intension either? The proposition: 'The existent round square does not exist' just seems to mean that the phrase has no denotation. The proposition that it does exist merely means that the word existence is part of the phrase. So interpreted the two propositions are compatible, but such an interpretation is incompatible with Miss Jones's theory for existential propositions at any rate. As regards (ii.) there is no doubt that Mr. Russell has found a genuine infinite regress; the only question is whether it is vicious. On Miss Jones's theory Scott is the Author of *Waverley* means What is denoted by Scott is identical with what is denoted by 'the Author of *Waverley*'. But this is a proposition and so it must be treated in the same way. This gives What is denoted by 'what is denoted by "Scott"' is identical with what is denoted by 'what is denoted by the "Author of *Waverley*,"' and so on *ad infinitum*. I hesitate to pronounce a decided opinion, but might not the solution be that what is denoted by 'Scott' is identical with what is denoted by 'what is denoted by "Scott"'? The regress would then be infinite, but not I think vicious.

Prof. Stout argues in his paper on 'The Object of Thought and Real Being' that everything that can be thought about must be supposed to have some kind of being other than that of being an object for thought. This must be true of the objects of erroneous judgments as well as of those of true ones; for, if you separate being as object of thought from real being at all, this must be done for the objects of true as well as those of false judgments. In that case we shall need a theory of correspondence between the two sorts of objects in order to distinguish between true and false judgments. But such a theory will not help us, for correspondence with *anything* will not do; it must be correspondence with the object that was actually intended in the judgment, and this object never is intended to have being merely as object of thought. In judgment we assert that one of a number of possible alternatives is fulfilled in the reality judged about. Prof. Stout holds that alternatives are not mere objects of thought, but also have real being. His argument is: We must accept the reality of universals, and they are essentially capable of alternative determinations. On the other hand alternatives always are relative to a universal. Hence we must accept the reality of alternative possibilities. The argument seems to me ambiguous. It no doubt proves that there are *alternants* of universals like isosceles and scalene with respect to triangularity, but does it prove that an *alternative* like 'isosceles or scalene' has real being? Might this not be reduced to 'triangularity is both isosceles and scalene, but not in the same instances'?

False belief consists in believing in a possibility being fulfilled when the alternative asserted is other than any fulfilled one. The paper concludes with a criticism of the theories of judgment of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Russell.

Prof. Caldwell contributes an interesting paper on Emotionality, with special reference to a mediæval Italian saint, and Mr. Dunville argues at length for the standpoint of subjective idealism within psychology.

D. BROAD.

The Scope of Formal Logic. By A. T. SHEARMAN. London: University Press, 1911. Pp. xiv, 166.

The main object of Dr. Shearman's little work is to explain and illustrate the principles of the newest symbolical logic, and to show its superiority in scope and power as an instrument of exact thinking over the traditional formal logic derived partly from Aristotle, partly from the Stoic logicians. In the actual execution of this programme he devotes himself chiefly to a simple exposition for the uninitiated of the guiding principles of the symbolic systems of Frege, Peano, and Russell, though his last two chapters are given to the consideration of philosophical issues of a more ultimate kind, the questions of the real nature of number and the absoluteness or relativity of position. As a first introduction to the study of a genuine Formal Logic Dr. Shearman's book has considerable value; it is clearly written, well-illustrated by examples, and there is just enough of it to stimulate its readers to wish for further acquaintance with the subject. These are considerable merits, but they are also accompanied by one or two considerable defects. For one thing, Dr. Shearman does not seem to have studied the authors whose views he expounds in their latest developments. In the case of Mr. Russell this was unavoidable, since his *Principia Mathematica* (composed in collaboration with Mr. Whitehead) came too late for use, but it was scarcely fair, in comparing Frege and Peano with one another and with Mr. Russell to take no account of the former's master-work, the *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik* (which differs for the better in many respects from the *Begriffsschrift*, the only book of Frege of which any great use is made in Dr. Shearman's volume), or to refer exclusively to an early version of Peano's *Formulaire* which attained its fifth, and apparently final, form two or three years ago. I am not sure that Dr. Shearman's view as to Frege's inferiority in philosophical grasp would have been maintained by any student of his ripest writings. It is, at least, noticeable that on more than one point Mr. Russell's Appendix I. to the *Principles of Mathematics*, and the later *Principia Mathematica* exhibit important differences from the text of the *Principles* which are directly traceable to the influence of Frege's *Grundgesetze*. And I have noted a passage in Dr. Shearman's own book where he falls into an error which would certainly have been prevented by study of Frege's little essay *Funktion und Begriff* (p. 10, second sentence).

There are also a number of odd statements about Mathematics which would, I imagine, surprise the authors for whom Dr. Shearman has so high a respect. E.g., at page 3, Euclid, I, 4, is declared to be a proposition dealing with "couples". In point of fact, nothing is said about a "couple" anywhere in the proposition, as Dr. Shearman may convince himself by trying to express it accurately in symbolic notation. I note the same confusion, in a different context, at page 86, where a relation R (it seems to be tacitly assumed, in defiance of known truth, that all simple relations are relations of two terms) is identical with the system of